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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent increases in cybercrime suggest questions such as: How can one trust a secure 
system? How can one protect private information from being stolen and maintain security? Trust 
in any system requires a foundation or root of trust. A root of trust is necessary to establish 
confidence that a machine is clean and that a software execution environment is secure. A root of 
trust can be implemented using the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), which is promising for 
enhancing security of general-purpose computing systems.  
In cloud computing, one of the proposed approaches is to use homomorphic encryption to 
create k program slices to be executed on k different cloud nodes. The TPM at the cloud node 
can then also be distributed or sliced along the lines presented in this thesis. 
In this work, we propose to increase TPM efficiency by distributing the TPM into multiple 
shares using Residue Number Systems (RNS). We then perform an evaluation of the silicon area, 
and execution time required for a sliced-TPM implementation and compares it to a single TPM. 
We characterize the execution time required by each TPM command using measurements 
obtained on ModelSim simulator.  
Finally, we show that the proposed scheme improves TPM efficiency and that execution 
time of TPM commands was noticeably improved. In the case of 4 shares the required execution 
time of the TPM commands that involving RSA operation in each slice was decreased by 93%, 
and the area of each slice was decreased by 2.93% while the total area was increased by 74%.  In 
the case of 10 shares the required execution time of the TPM commands that involving RSA 
operations in each slice was decreased by 99%, and the area of each slice was decreased by 3.3% 
while the total area was increased by 85%. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
With increasing demand for Cloud Computing, maintaining security has never been more 
important. The common e-services must be accompanied by numerous security mechanisms to 
protect our personal information. For instance, if a user submits private data to an online site or 
to another user’s machine, there may be no mechanism to verify that that machine is trustworthy 
and has a Cyber-Secure environment. In other words, it is critical that a user be able to judge 
whether a system is trusted and that personal information cannot be stolen or misused. Trust in 
any system requires a foundation or a root of trust. A root of trust should establish that a machine 
is clean and that the execution environment is secure. A static root of trust is not a complete 
solution for confirming trust; it is only one component of the solution [1]. 
To establish and ensure an appropriate level of trust, an industry consortium of more than 
160 companies, including HP, IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and many others, has taken responsibility 
for establishing trust through establishment of a not-for-profit organization, the Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) [2], to propose Trusted Platform Module (TPM) specifications that 
have become ISO/IEC standards.  
In its trusted-platform architecture, the TCG defines three distinctive roots of trust: a root 
of trust for measurement (RTM) to generate reliable integrity measurements, a root of trust for 
storage (RTS) to protect data and keys entrusted to the TPM, and a root of trust for reporting 
(RTR) responsible for reliably reporting integrity information to a verifier. Each root is a 
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computing engine entrusted with performing one or more of the main functions a trusted 
platform must provide [3].  
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware module attached to a computer's 
motherboard. Using this hardware along with supporting software, a TPM’s goal is to ensure 
trust in end-user systems and to provide reliable and secure platforms for mission-sensitive 
individual or business operations. The TPM provides a root of trust, including a Root of Trust for 
Reporting, a Root of Trust for Storage, and cryptographic key generation, along with other 
functions. A Root of Trust for measurement (RTM) measures a digest of a sequence of events 
and reports to the TPM; using a boost platform.  
To avoid a wide range of hardware-based attacks, a TPM chip should implement tamper-
resistance techniques. Supplementing computers with this hardware module adds powerful 
functionality for their security. Because of the critical functionality provided by the TPM, there 
are many vendors fabricating TPM chips. Most new desktop and laptop PCs, for example, come 
with built-in TPMs [4].  
The major cryptographic features supported in TPMs are random-number generation (RNG), 
SHA-1 (Hash algorithm), RSA, and asymmetric encryption/decryption. The RSA algorithm is 
used for asymmetric encryption/decryption and for digital signatures. To provide protected 
storage, the minimum recommended RSA key size is 2048 bits, but using such large keys tends 
to make the TPM relatively slow. For instance, Private Key operations can require more than 0.5 
million cycles for completion [5]. In addition, a TPM chip may be inefficient not only with 
respect to time; it also tends to have high energy consumption and requires a large silicon area. 
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1.2 Solution Approaches 
In cloud computing, a residue number system can be used to design a homomorphic 
encryption function representing a form of encryption directly performing a ciphertext operation, 
with the operation’s results automatically encrypted even if the secret key is unknown.  Using a 
homomorphic encryption scheme in the cloud allows it to perform meaningful computations on 
the data even though it is encrypted [6]. 
 We also can distribute the TPM to the cloud node using homomorphic encryption. Our 
approach is to divide the TPM into k shares using a residue number system, then distribute the 
resulting slices to multiple nodes; we envision that these nodes can be hosted on k separate 
clouds. 
Our hypothesis is that such a sliced implementation would result in a lower execution time 
for the TPM operations. This will also increase the security of the TPM since the data is 
distributed. 
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CHAPTER 2. TRUSTED COMPUTING PLATFORMS 
 
2.1 Trusted Computing Group 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is a not-for-profit international industry standards 
group. TCG was formed in 1999 when Compaq, HP, IBM, Intel and Microsoft founded the 
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) whose main goal was to promote trust and 
security in personal computing platforms. By 2003 over 200 companies had joined this 
organization, resulting in a Trusted Computing Group with a variety of structures but with the 
same goals as the TCPA [7]. The TCG is responsible for developing guidelines and 
specifications for adding trusted hardware to various computing platforms. These specifications 
help protect data, hardware, and other resources from theft, damage, or compromise without 
adversely impacting the rights of participating individuals or businesses. A Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) is a major building block in achieving the goals of a TCG [2].  
2.2 Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) 
2.2.1 Introduction 
In general, trust in computer infrastructure is defined as confidence that an entity will act 
as expected [8]. In the context of trusted platforms, trusted authority certifies that a platform with 
a particular identity can be trusted to operate as expected. The TCG has released a set of 
specifications specifying how a Trusted Platform must be constructed; it should contain a Core 
Root of Trust for Measurement, a Trusted Platform Module, and support software. A Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware chip attached to the main platform CPU, and it can 
securely store cryptographic keys used to authenticate the platform and protect its information. 
5 
 
 
Furthermore, to ensure that a platform remains trustworthy, a TPM can be employed to store 
platform measurements. A TPM also serve as a key generator and as a key management device 
[9].  
 
Figure 2.1: TPM major components.  
Figure 2.1 shows the major components of a TPM, including the following: 
 I/O: This component manages information flow over the communication bus. 
 Key generation: This component responsible for creating RSA key pairs and symmetric 
keys. 
 RSA engine: The RSA algorithm is used for encryption and digital signatures.  
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 SHA-1 engine: hash capability, a trusted implementation of a hash algorithm. It is thus a 
primary component of the TPM. 
 Random number generator (RNG): This is the source of random values required for key 
generation and nonce values. 
  Platform configuration registers (PCRs): These are 160 bit values that are SHA-1 
digests. The integrity metrics, obtained from measuring state, are stored in PCRs. 
 Non-Volatile memory: This memory contains persistent state information, e.g., TPM 
identity information. 
 Symmetric Crypto Engine: Used for encryption / decryption of command packets and to 
safely store internal TPM data on an external device. 
2.2.2 Platform Configuration Register (PCR) 
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) are sets of 20-byte storage locations used to 
store SHA-1 digests that represent platform integrity measurements. It is shielded inside the 
TPM where data is protected against interference and exposure. Each TPM contains 16 PCRs, 8 
for hardware and 8 for software; These PCRs allow a secure representation of the host system's 
configuration metric that can be used to monitor any changes in the software and hardware 
configurations. The hash value of any PCR is updated by concatenating a new digest value with 
the original digest value, followed by an SHA-1 operation whose result is stored back to the PCR 
[10].  
2.2.3 TPM Key Types 
TPM keys are classified into three categories: migratable keys, non-migratable keys and 
certifiable migratable keys. Such classification determines whether a key can transfer from one 
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TPM to another. When a key is generated, the category value is established and cannot be 
changed [10]. 
 Non-migratable keys are bound and unique to a single TPM and can’t be exported 
from the TPM. Non-migratable keys are stored at a TPM-shielded location and are 
only usable within the TPM that generated them. 
  Migratable keys are not bound to a single TPM; they are designed to protect data 
that can be used on more than one platform and can be generated either outside or 
inside the TPM. One advantage to keys of this type is that they can be restored from 
a defective platform onto a new platform. 
 Certifiable Migratable Keys are midway between migratable keys and non-
migratable keys. 
2.2.3.1 TPM Key Hierarchy 
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) defines a key hierarchy with respect to to the 
Endorsement Key (EK) and the Storage Root Key (SRK).  Figure 2.2 shows a typical TPM key 
hierarchy. The important TPM keys are defined as follows [10]: 
 Endorsement Key (EK)  
At the end of TPM chip fabrication, the manufacturer creates a unique RSA 
private/public Endorsement key pair in a secure environment. This key is stored in the 
TPM and it is a private key that can only be used inside the TPM. It can’t leave the TPM. 
An Endorsement Key is used to decrypt messages associated with AIK generation and to 
decrypt owner authorization data.  
 Storage Root Key (SRK) 
8 
 
 
The SRK is a key pair created inside the TPM during execution of its ownership protocol. 
The SRK is a non-migratable key; it therefore never leaves the TPM. A new SRK key 
pair can be created if the TPM is reset. 
 
Figure 2.2: Key hierachy which is maintained by the TPM. 
 Storage Key  
An RSA private/public key. Storage Keys are used to encrypt others keys and data 
outside a TPM. 
 Signing Key  
An asymmetric key that can be used to sign external data and messages or internal TPM 
state.  
 Binding Key  
  An asymmetric key that can be used to decrypt (unbind) data encrypted on another 
platform.  
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2.2.4 TPM Commands  
The following are some useful TPM Commands [11]: 
 TPM_LoadKey2 
This function is used to Load a key into the TPM to allow the TPM to use the key in 
other commands such as seal, unseal, sign, and unbind.   
 TPM_Sign 
This command is used to sign data presented to the TPM and return the resulting digital 
signature. 
 TPM_UnBind 
This command used to decrypt data that has been encrypted with a public key outside the 
TPM. 
 TPM_Seal 
 Encrypts data so that it can be decrypted (Unseal) only in the same TPM by sealing the 
data to specific PCR values. 
 TPM_Unseal 
This command is used to decrypt sealed blobs inside the TPM. 
 TPM_Extend 
 This command is used to add new data to a PCR. Specifically, the PCR is extended 
according to the following formula: 
PCRi NEW← SHA-1(PCRi Old value || data to add) 
 TPM_GetRandom 
This command is used to obtain a random number from the TPM random-number 
generator. TPM uses the random number to generate keys and nonce.  
10 
 
 
 TPM_CreateWrapKey  
 This command is used to create a secure RSA key pair that can be locked to a specific 
PCR value. 
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CHAPTER 3. BASIC TPM COMPONENTS 
3.1 RSA Cryptography Engine 
3.1.1 Introduction 
In 1977, R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman introduced the RSA cryptosystem [12], 
and it became the most widely-used public-key cryptosystem in the world. It is used to secure 
network traffic systems, e-mail, e-business, and e-commerce, and it can be used to provide data 
encryption and digital signature capability. Success of RSA cryptography ultimately rests on the 
idea that there is no efficient way to factor very large integers [13]. The RSA algorithm is based 
on exponentiation in a finite (Galois) field over integers modulo a prime. 
RSA encryption/decryption is a slow process since it is based on arithmetic modulo large 
numbers. While many studies seeking a fast implementation of RSA have been carried out,  as 
far as we know the Montgomery reduction algorithm has been the most efficient way to speed up 
the modular multiplications and squaring required during the exponentiation process [14]. 
3.1.2 RSA algorithm 
 
The RSA algorithm defines a protocol to secure message exchanges in communication 
systems.  An RSA cryptosystem includes three algorithms: Key Generation, an encryption 
algorithm, and a decryption algorithm. 
3.1.2.1 Key Generation 
The key generation algorithm is the most complex part of RSA whose purpose is to 
generate private and  public keys used separately for RSA encryption and decryption operations. 
The steps for generating a key pair are given in algorithm 1 [15].  
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Algorithm 1: key generation 
Outputs: a private key (n, d), a public key (n, e). 
Function: keyGeneration 
 Select two random prime numbers p and q.  
 Calculate n = p x q 
 Calculate Φ (n) = (p – 1) x (q – 1) 
 Select integer e such that gcd (ø(n),e) =1 (1<e< Φ(n); where e & Φ(n) are relatively 
prime) 
 Calculate d = e-1 mod ø(n) ( by using the Extended Euclidian algorithm). 
 
 
To generate secure RSA keys, the two prime numbers p and q should be very large and 
have at least 512 digits, and they should have approximately the same bit length. Finding two 
large random prime numbers p and q determines the approximate total key generation time; an 
efficient algorithm for generating such large prime numbers is given in detail in Chapter 4 [16].  
The public key (n, e) is a prime number chosen in the range [3, Φ (n)]; it is usually chosen small 
to increase the efficiency of the exponentiation algorithm required by the encryption step. The 
TCG specifies that the RSA public exponent must be e = 216+1. The private key (n, d) and public 
key (n, e) are multiplicative inverses modulo Ф (n). Since the public key has a GCD of 1 with Φ 
(n), Euclid’s extended algorithm can be used to calculate d, as described in Section 3.1.4 [17]. 
Encryption and Decryption algorithm. 
 
This algorithm is required for transforming a plaintext message into ciphertext and vice 
versa using public and private keys, as illustrated in Algorithm 2. 
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Algorithm 2: RSA encryption-decryption protocol 
Alice encrypts a message m and sends it to Bob; Bob decrypts the message 
Encryption Decryption 
 Alice received public key (n, e) from Bob. 
 Alice represents the message m as an 
integer. 
 Alice computes c = me mod n. 
 Alice sends the cyphertext to Bob. 
 
  Bob used its private key (d) to 
recover the message m form the 
cyphertext  m = cd mod n. 
 
Modular exponentiation for a large number is performed as a series of modular 
multiplication and squaring operations. Many methods have been proposed to accelerate modular 
multiplication, and the most efficient method has been found to be a Montgomery reduction 
algorithm [17] introduced by Peter Montgomery. It replaces trial divisions by a modulus with a 
series of additions and divisions. The Montgomery algorithm is introduced in Section 3.1.5.  
 
Example 3.1:  RSA cryptosystem. 
 
Assume that Bob wants to create a public-key cryptosystem, and Alice wants to use the 
public key to encrypt plaintext string 5423 and send it to Bob. Figure 3.1 shows a common 
procedure used by the RSA Architecture 
 First, Bob should generate public and private keys via the following steps:  
 Choose the primes p = 137 and q = 151 
 Compute n = p · q = 20687, and   Φ (n) = (p − 1) · (q − 1) = 20400. 
 Select the public exponent e = 3503 such that it satisfys the constraint gcd (e,φ(n))=1, and 
is small compared with Φ (n).  
Compute d = e-1 mod φ(n) = 6767.  
 Publish the pair (20687, 3503) and keep p, q, and d private. 
14 
 
 
 
When Alice receives Bob’s public key, she should: 
 Compute the cyphertext as 5423e mod n = 54233503 mod 20687= 16631 
 Send 16631 to Bob  
 
When Bob receives this cyphertext, he should use his private key to recover the message. 
 Compute 16631d mod n = 166316767 mod 20687= 5423. 
 
Figure 3.1: RSA Architecture. 
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3.1.3 Primality Tests 
Primality tests are methods for determining whether or not an input is a prime number. 
These methods are classified into two categories. In the first category, for example, one can 
prove that a number is prime by using a trial division test and the Wilson's theorem test. In the 
second category, one can prove that a number is composite using, for example, the Miller-Rabin 
tests, the Fermat primality test, or the Solovay–Strassen primality test. The Miller-Rabin test is 
the most widely-used primality test because it yields an accurate result in a relatively short time 
[18]. 
In the present study, the Miller-Rabin test is implemented to specify the primality of a 
number. It relies on Fermat's theorem that states that, if n is a prime number, then (an-1 mod n) = 
1 for any integer a in the range [2, n - 1]. A full algorithm implementing Miller and Rabin's 
primality test is shown below [19].  
Algorithm 4: Primarily Tests 
Input: n, is an integer to be tested for primality           
Output: probably prime, or composite  
Function: PrimarilyTests 
                write n − 1 as 2s·d with d odd by factoring powers of 2 from n − 1 
                LOOP 1: repeat k times: k, determines the accuracy of the test 
                               select a randomly in the range [2, n - 1] 
                               x ← ad mod n 
                              if (x = 1 or x = n – 1) then   next LOOP 1 
                              LOOP 2: repeat s – 1 times 
                                             x ← x2 mod n 
                                             if (x = 1) then return composite 
                                             if (x = n – 1) then  next LOOP 1  
                                             return composite  
                            return probably prime 
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3.1.4 Extended Euclidean Algorithm. 
The extended Euclidean algorithm is an extension to the Euclidean algorithm for finding 
the greatest common divisor of two positive integers a and b; it can also be used to find integers 
x and y such that ax + by = gcd (a, b).  The extended Euclidean algorithm is especially useful 
when a and b are coprime, since x is the modular multiplicative inverse of a mod b; similarly, y 
is the modular multiplicative inverse of b mod a [20]. Implementation of the extended Euclidean 
algorithm is given by Algorithm 5.  
Algorithm 5: Extended Euclidean Algorithm 
Input: integers Φ (n) and e. 
Output: d = e -1 mod Φ (n). 
 Function: ExtendedEuclideanAlgorithm 
          Set     d = 0, and    newd = 1.     
          Set     r = Φ (n), and   newr = e.  
           while newr ≠ 0 
                       quotient = (r / newr). 
                        (d, newd) := (newd, d - quotient * newd)  
                        (r, newr) := (newr, r - quotient * newr) 
            if (r > 1)  return "e is not invertible". 
            if d < 0 then d := d + Φ (n). 
            return d 
 
3.1.5 Montgomery multiplication  
 
The Montgomery modular multiplication algorithm was introduced in 1985 by Peter 
Montgomery. It computes modular multiplication z = (a * b) mod (n) using simple operations 
such as additions, multiplications, and shifts. The idea is that, by using an n-residue 
representation of the operands, division by modulus n is replaced by division by a power of 2, 
accomplished by a simple shift operation. However, to avoid performing division-by-n 
operations, the costly operations come at the expense of the need to convert operands into 
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Montgomery’s domain; this time requirement is negligible compared with that of multi-modular 
multiplication [21], [22]. The Montgomery multiplication algorithm for calculating z = a* b mod 
(n) is outlined in Algorithm 6.  
 
Algorithm 6: Montgomery multiplication algorithm 
 Convert operands into Montgomery’s domain 
               A = a*r (mod n)    where r=2k, and n is the k-bit modulus. 
               B = b*r (mod n)    where r=2k, and n is the k-bit modulus. 
 Calculates the Montgomery product of A and B 
              Input: n where n is the k-bit modulus, A in Montgomery’s domain,  
                         B in Montgomery’s domain 
              Output: Z = (A * B * r-1) mod (n) 
              Function: MontgomeryProduct (A,B) 
                               Set Z[0] = 0  
                         LOOP : repeat k times:  for i=0 to i= k-1.   
                                      qi  = (Z[i]0 + Ai * B0) mod 2 . 
                                      Z[i+1] = (Z[i] + Ai * B + qi * n) div 2. 
                        end LOOP 
                        return Z[k] 
 Backward conversions from Montgomery’s domain 
            z = Z * r-1 (mod n) where r=2k, and n is the k-bit modulus 
 
 
 
It is important to note that these forward and backward conversions can be carried out using the 
MontgomeryProduct algorithm as follows:  
A= MontgomeryProduct (a, r2 ) =  (a * r 2 * r −1  ) mod (n) = (a * r ) mod (n)  
a = MontgomeryProduct (A, 1) = (a * 1 * r −1  ) mod (n)= (a * r-1) mod (n). 
 
Example 3.2: using the Montgomery method to compute a * b mod (n), where  a = 21, b = 7, and 
n=13; 
 Convert operands into Montgomery’s domain 
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  r = 2⌈log213⌉ = 24 = 16  
               A = a*r (mod n)   =21 * 16 mod 13 = 11 = 10112 
               B = b*r (mod n)    =7 * 16 mod 13 = 8 = 10002 
 Calculate the Montgomery product of A and B. 
Table 3.1: Montgomery Step. 
I qi  = (Z[i]0 + Ai * B0) mod 2 Z[i+1] = (Z[i] + Ai * B + qi * n) div 2 
0 q0  = (Z[0]0 + A0 * B0) mod 2 
q0 = (0+1*0)mod(2)=0 
Z[1] = (Z[0] + A0 * B + q0 * n) div 2 
Z[1] =(0+1*8+0*13) div 2 = 4 
1 q1  = (Z[1]0 + A1 * B0) mod 2 
q1 = (0+1*0)mod(2)=0 
Z[2] = (Z[1] + A1 * B + q1 * n) div 2 
Z[2] =(4+1*8+0*13) div 2 = 6 
2 q2  = (Z[2]0 + A2 * B0) mod 2 
q2 = (0+0*0)mod(2)=0 
Z[3] = (Z[2] + A2 * B + q2 * n) div 2 
Z[3] =(6+0*8+0*13) div 2 = 3 
3 q3  = (Z[3]0 + A3 * B0) mod 2 
q2 = (1+1*0)mod(2)=1 
Z[4] = (Z[3] + A3 * B + q3 * n) div 2 
Z[4] =(3+1*8+1*13) div 2 = 12 
 
 Backward conversions from Montgomery’s domain 
            z = Z * r-1 (mod n) =12 * 16-1 mod 13 = 4 as it should. 
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3.2 Random Numbers Generation Engine 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
High-quality random numbers are required for generating unpredictable cryptographic 
keys. Random-number generation approaches are classified into two methods: pseudo-random 
number generators (PRNGs) and true random number generators (TRNGs). The pseudo-random 
numbers are generated by a combination of binary flip-flops initially loaded with a small value; 
PRNG sequences are thus relatively predictable and not suitable for use in cryptographic keys. 
True random number generators (TRNGs) generate truly random number sequences by 
measuring random natural physical phenomena such as electronic and thermal noise; TRNGs are 
therefore unpredictable [23] [24]. In this work, random numbers were generated using Ring 
Oscillator Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) that produce random values from hidden delay 
information then we used this random numbers as seeds to Linear Feedback Shift Registers 
(LFSRs).  
3.2.2 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)  
The concept of ring-oscillator-derived Physical Unclonable Functions (RO-PUFs) is 
based on the delay contrast between two identically-structured ring oscillators that occurs 
because each ring oscillator has a unique frequency resulting from variations in the hardware 
manufacturing process.  
Figure 3.2 illustrates an RO-PUF circuit. The basic structure of a conventional RO-PUF is 
comprised of: n identically ring oscillators, an n-to-2 multiplexer, two counters, and one 
comparator. Each of the identical ROs oscillates with a different frequency, to generate an 
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unpredictable sequence of bits; one pair of ring oscillators is selected. The counters then count 
the oscillation cycles for a certain time period. 
 
Figure 3.2: RO-PUF basic structure. 
Finally, the outputs of the counters are compared based on which oscillator has a higher 
frequency. If the upper counter shows a higher value than the lower counter, the corresponding 
output is set to ‘1’; otherwise, the output is set to ‘0’ [25] [26]. 
3.2.3 Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) 
The Linear Feedback Shift Register is a shift register whose input bit is a linear function 
of its previous state; the initial value of the LFSR is called the seed. LFSR is the most useful 
techniques used for generating pseudorandom numbers.  
An example of a 512-bit LFSR is shown in Figure 3.3. The feedback is created by performing 
the exclusive-OR (XOR) of the outputs of selected flip-flops and then feeding this back to the 
input of least significant bit flip-flop.  
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In this work 512-bit pseudorandom numbers are generated using LFSR. The polynomial 
used for generating this sequence is as below [27]. 
P(X) = X512 + X510 +X 507  
 
 
Figure 3.3: 512-bit LFSR 
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3.3 Hash Engine 
3.3.1 Introduction 
 
A cryptographic hash function is a procedure that takes an arbitrary block of input data 
and returns a output shorter than the input with a fixed number of bits. The input data to be 
encoded is called the "message," and the output or “hash” values are called the message digest or 
simply the digest. While is infeasible to recover the original text from a hash alone, it is also 
impossible that different inputs will produce an identical digest. These properties make hashes 
ideally suited to many aspects of cryptography, and there are many different types of hash 
functions with various security properties [27]. 
3.3.2 The Hash Function SHA1 
 
The hash function known as SHA1” Secure Hashing Algorithm” was finalized in 1995, 
when a FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standard) was advanced by the US National 
Institute of Standards that specified SHA1. The SHA-1 algorithm is valid for messages with a 
size less than 264 bits; if a message is longer than 264 bits, it must be separated into several groups 
with each containing 264 bits. Each message group will then consist of a block of size 512 bits, a 
word size of 32 bits, and a resultant message digest of 160 bits. SHA-1 can be described as 
operating in two stages: preprocessing and hash computation.  
3.3.2.1 Preprocessing 
Preprocessing consists of three steps: 
 Pad the message with a single one followed by zeroes until the resulting block has 448 
bits. Then the size of the original message is appended as an unsigned 64-bit integer. 
 Parse the Padded Message into N m-bit blocks. 
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 Initialize the hash values Hi(0) to the specific constants defined in the SHA1 standard 
(shown in table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Initial Hash Values [27]. 
Intermediate Hash Variable Constant Value 
H0 0x67452301 
H1 0xEFCDAB89 
H2 0x98BADCFE 
H3 0x10325476 
H4 0xC3D2E1F0 
 
3.3.2.2 SHA-1 hash Computation 
 
SHA-1 uses a sequence of eighty constant 32-bit words, K0, K1,…, K79 defined in the 
SHA1 standard (shown in table 3.3). In addition, it uses a sequence of logical functions, f0, f1,…, 
f79, each operating on three 32-bit words, x, y, and z, to produce a 32-bit word as output. The 
function ft (x, y, z) is defined as follows [27]:
 
Table 3.3: Constant K Values [27]. 
Range of t K Value 
0 < t < 19 0x5A827999 
20 < t < 39 0x6ED9EBA1 
40 < t < 49 0x8F1BBCDC 
60 < t < 79 0xCA62C1D6 
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The process requires 4 rounds of 20 operations each, resulting in a total of 80 operations, to 
generate the final digest. 
After preprocessing is completed, each message block, M(1), M(2), …, M(N)  requires 4 rounds 
of 20 operations each, resulting in a total of 80 operations, to produce the final 160-bit message 
digest.  
 The message schedule is first prepared as follows:  
 
Then 32-bit variables a, b, c, d, and e are initialized as follows: 
 
 
Sequential operations are next repeated 80 times. One such operation is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
 Kt and Wt are constant values for iteration t and the tth w-bit word of the message schedule, 
correspondingly. ROTL (i) stands for circular shift by i positions to the left, and the function 
ft(x,y,z) described above represents the non-linear function of the  SHA-1.  
 
25 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Consecutive SHA-1 operation blocks for one iteration 
 
Finally, the ith intermediate hash value H(i) is computed as follows: 
 
 After repeating these steps for each massage M (N), a 160-bit message digest is produced by 
combining the hash value H(N). 
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3.4 Symmetric Crypto Engine 
 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The symmetric cryptographic engine acts as a 128-bit block cipher engine. The term 
“symmetric cryptographic” refers to applying one cryptographic key for both decryption and 
encryption. The algorithm, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), is also known as Rijndael. 
It operates on blocks of 128 bits by using keys with lengths of 128 bits for the decryption and 
encryption processes [28]. 
3.4.2 AES algorithm 
The AES algorithm operates on a 4×4 matrix of bytes called a State. At the beginning of the 
encryption process, the plaintext message is expanded into a State. Then, an initial Round Key 
operation is conducted on the State. This is followed by 10 rounds of transformation, each round 
consisting of all the following transformations, except that the final round also includes the 
SubBytes, ShiftRows and AddRoundKey transformations [29].  
 SubBytes: a non-linear substitution step in which each byte is replaced with another from 
to a lookup table.  
 ShiftRows: a transposition step in which each row of the state is shifted cyclically a 
certain number of steps.  
 MixColumns: a mixing operation operating on the columns of the state, combining the 
four bytes in each column  
 AddRoundKey: each byte of the state is combined with the round key; each round key is 
derived from the cipher key using a key schedule.  
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Figure 3.5: AES algorithm 
 
After the cipher operations are performed on the State, the final value of the state is copied to the 
ciphertext. A complete algorithm is shown in Figure 3.4. 
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CHAPTER 4. RNS PRELIMINARIES 
4.1 Introduction 
A residue number system RNS is a non-weighted number system based on the Chinese 
remainder theorem of modular arithmetic. RNS represents large integer numbers as a set of 
relative smaller integers called residues. The main advantage of the RNS is absence of carry 
propagation between the columns in addition steps, resulting in improved high-speed 
computational performance. However, since RNS is a non-weighted system, magnitude-related 
operations such as division, magnitude comparison, and sign detection are more difficult to 
perform than are arithmetic operations such as additions, subtraction, and multiplication [30].  
4.2 RNS Representation 
A residue number system is completely defined by a set of relatively prime integers 
called moduli M = (m1, m2, ..., mk), where mi is the ith modulus. The moduli should be pairwise 
relatively prime, meaning that, for every pair of moduli, the greatest common divisor is 1. 
An integer X can be represented as a list of smaller integers called residues [ x1, x2 , …,xk ] where 
xi is the i
th residue. The relationship between the modulus and the residues can be written as: 
                                                          X mod (mi) = xi 
       XM=[ x1, x2 , …,xk ]=[X mod (m1), X mod (m2),…., X mod (mk) ] 
The RNS system provides unique representations for integers in the range from 0 to the product 
of all the moduli. The moduli (m1, m2, ..., mk) has a dynamic range m1 × m2 × ···× mk [31]. 
Example 4.1: RNS numerical example.  
Consider a residue number system defined by the moduli set [2, 3, 5]. The representation of the 
numbers is shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: RNS representation for moduli set [2, 3, 5]. 
X 
[2, 3, 5] 
X 
[2, 3, 5] 
2 3 5 2 3 5 
0 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 
1 1 1 1 17 1 2 2 
2 0 2 2 18 0 0 3 
3 1 0 3 19 1 1 4 
4 0 1 4 20 0 2 0 
5 1 2 0 21 1 0 1 
6 0 0 1 22 0 1 2 
7 1 1 2 23 1 2 3 
8 0 2 3 24 0 0 4 
9 1 0 4 25 1 1 0 
10 0 1 0 26 0 2 1 
11 1 2 1 27 1 0 2 
12 0 0 2 28 0 1 3 
13 1 1 3 29 1 2 4 
14 0 2 4 30 0 0 0 
15 1 0 0 31 1 1 1 
 
The residues in table 4.1 uniquely identify a number for all numbers in the range from 0 to 
29. For instance, the decimal number 10 is represented by the configuration [0, 1, 0] just as 
uniquely as binary 10102. However, outside that range, the RNS representation repeats itself. For 
example, the RNS representation of 31 is the same as that of 1. In addition, the moduli must be 
relatively prime to ensure unique representation within the dynamic range. For example, consider 
the moduli set is [2, 3, 9] not relatively prime since 3 and 9 have a common divisor of 3. We 
observe that the RNS representation for 6 = [0, 0, 6] is the same as the RNS representation for 24 
= [0, 0, 6]. 
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4.3 Selection of the Moduli 
There are certain moduli more appealing than others; one example would be Mersenne 
numbers because they are efficient in their binary representation. All numbers of the form 2k-1 
(where k is a prime), called Mersenne numbers, were first suggested by Mersenne [30].  
The modulus values should be selected as close to one another as possible to limit the size of the 
largest modulus. Merrill suggests in [32] that the largest modulus should be of the form 2k and 
the second largest modulus should be of the form 2k-1. The moduli should be relatively prime. 
For example, a 17-bit number could be represented by the moduli set [32, 31, 15, 7]. We have 
25× (25-1) × (24-1) × (23-1) =217 – Ơ(214). 
where Ơ(214) indicates a term on order of 214. As a result, we have lost less than 1 bit of dynamic 
range representation. 
4.4 Chinese Remainder Theorem 
The uniqueness property is the consequence of a most important theory, the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem, that allows the computation of the equivalent number of an RNS 
representation [33]. 
Theorem 1: (Chinese Remainder Theorem) 
Given a set of pairwise relatively prime moduli (m1,m2, ...,mk), there exists exactly one integer 
that satisfies the conditions: 
n ≤ X < n +M 
xi = X mod(mi)   
Where i = 1, .., k,  M = m1 × m2 × ···× mk, and n is an integer.  
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CHAPTER 5. APPROACH 
5.1 Problem Definition 
 
As described in Chapter 2, the RSA Engine is one of the major components of the TPM. 
The primary advantage of using the RSA cryptography in the TPM is its increased security and 
convenience. However, the downside of this approach is that the TPM becomes a relatively slow 
device; the RSA operations are time-consuming and very complex.  
In this thesis, we propose a new architecture to advance the speed of the TPM by breaking it into 
multiple slices based on a residue number system (RNS) and then distributing the resulting slices 
to multiple platforms. 
5.2 TPM-sliced Architecture 
In this work, we propose a fast TPM based on Residue Number Systems. In other words, 
we divided the TPM into multiple slices by reducing the Key size for each share based on the 
RNS. The TPM consists of three major components: the RSA Engine, the HASH Engine, and the 
AES Engine. To divide the TPM we should divide each component by itself. However, since the 
RSA is the most expensive computation of all there is no reason to distribute or slice the Hash 
function or the AES function.  
RNS exhibits several advantages that facilitate fast, parallel, implementation of long-
integer arithmetic [34]. This makes RNS a good candidate for splitting the TPM. We know from 
[35] that slicing the RSA system into multiple shares using a residue number system is possible. 
For example, if we have a TPM that uses a 1024-bit RSA, we can divide it into 4 slices; each 
slide uses a 256-bit RSA Cryptosystem rather than a 1024-bit Cryptosystem. Figure 5.1 shows 
the structure of the proposed architecture.  
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The following steps explain the underlying process of the proposed architecture: 
 Select a moduli-set [m1, m2 ,m3,m4 ] where the moduli are relatively prime. 
 Convert RSA keys (N, d, e) to RNS representation. 
The residue sets are[Nm1,Nm2,Nm3,Nm4],[dm1,d2,dm3,dm4] and[em1,em2,em3,em4], 
respectively.. 
If a message X requires encryption or decryption using the RSA cryptosystem, 
 Convert the message to RNS representation. The residue set is [Xm1,Xm2,Xm3,Xm4]. 
 Divide each residue into the corresponding sliced-TPM. 
 Compute the cyber-text for each message residue inside the sliced-TPM. 
 Backward convert the encrypted/ decrypted message from RNS representation into 
ordinary weighted numbers.  
Figure 5.1: General structure of the proposed architecture. 
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CHAPTER 6. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS  
 
6.1 Hardware Implementation 
For hardware design and implementation, we first implemented a small version of a 
single TPM that can perform a few commands. We then divided this TPM into k shares. The 
functionality of the proposed algorithm was coded in Verilog, synthesized using 0.05 µm CMOS 
technology, and simulated in Modelsim. 
6.1.1 Single TPM Implementation 
 
TPM_TOP is the main module of the TPM.  It controls the functions of 6 sub-modules:  
TPM_Extend, TPM_GetRandom, TPM_CreateWrapKey, TPM_Sign, TPM_Seal, and TPM_Unseal. 
The following sections describe the operation of each individual sub-module. A block diagram of 
the TPM_TOP module is given in Figure 6.1. 
     
 
Figure 6.1: Bock diagram of the TPM_TOP module. 
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This module has 7 input signals and 3 output signals. The input signals are clk, reset, 
start, addr, we, oe, and IN_Bytes, while the output signals are ready, valid, and Out_Bytes. The 
functions of these signals are described in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Input output signals for TPM_TOP module. 
Pin name Size (bit) Description 
Clk 1 Standard clock 
Reset 1 Reset all output to zero when reset is high 
Start 1 Start the functions 
Addr 8 Address Input 
We 1 Write Enable 
Oe 1 Output Enable 
IN_Bytes 32 Input message block 
Valid 1 Indicates that the source has put valid data on the Out Bytes 
Ready 1 Indicates that the module is ready to receive new data 
Out_Bytes 32 Output message block 
 
 
6.1.1.1 TPM_Extend Module 
This module implements the basic functions of the TPM_Extend command. This 
command modifies the current PCR digest relative to the 20-byte input digest. Figure 6.2 shows 
an example of flow between the operator and TPM. 
 
Figure 6.2: Example flow for TPM Extend command. 
 
Figure 6.3 Example for an input message block of the TPM_Extend command. 
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Figure 6.3: Input message block for the TPM_Extend command. 
 
There are 5 input signals in this module. The Authorization Tag “defines the level of 
authorization”, the Parameter Size” the size of the incoming block”, the Ordinal “the command 
code of the TPM function”, the PCR index “points to shielded memory location”, and the Input 
Digest is a “20-byte digest”. 
The resulting output command message block associated with this input is given in 
Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4: Output message block for the TPM_Extend command. 
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6.1.1.2 TPM_GetRandom Module  
This module implements the basic functions of the TPM_ GetRandom command. This is a 
simple command that generates a random number; a 512-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register and 
512-bit PUF are used to produce a wide sequence of random bits. Figure 6.5 shows an example 
of TPM_ GetRandom command flow between the TPM and a user application. 
 
Figure 6.5: Example flow for TPM GetRandom command. 
Figure 6.6 gives an example of an input message block for the TPM_ GetRandom 
command. 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Input message block for the TPM_ GetRandom command. 
 
There are 4 input signals in this module. The Authorization Tag, the Parameter Size, the 
Ordinal, and the Bytes Request “specify the size of the random Data”. The resulting output 
command message block associated with this input is given in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: Output message block for the TPM_ GetRandom command. 
 
6.1.1.3 TPM_CreateWrapKey Module 
The TPM_ CreateWrapKey command generates an RSA key, then encrypts the private 
key using a parent key provided in the input message. Figure 6.8 shows an example of TPM_ 
CreateWrapKey command flow between the TPM and a user application
 
Figure 6.8: TPM_ CreateWrapKey command flow. 
Figure 6.9 gives an example of an input message block for the TPM_ CreateWrapKey 
command. 
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Figure 6.9: Input message block for the TPM_ CreateWrapKey command. 
 
There are 8 input signals in this module: Authorization Tag, Parameter Size, Ordinal, key 
Handle” to handle a loaded key that can perform key wrapping”, nonceOdd” Nonce generated by 
the system associated with Key Handle”, TCG-Key “Information about key to be created, 
pubkey.keyLength and keyInfo” that consists of: Key to create, Digest at Creation, and Digest at 
Release. The resulting output command message block associated with this input is given in 
Figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10: Output message block for the TPM_ CreateWrapKey command. 
6.1.1.4 TPM_Sign Module 
 
The TPM_ Sign command generates an RSA signature of up to 512-bit data. 
Figure 6.11 shows an example of TPM_ Sign command flow between the TPM and a user 
application. Example of an input message block for the TPM_ Sign command is given in 
Figure 6.12. 
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Figure 6.11: TPM_ Sign command flow. 
 
Figure 6.12: Input message block for the TPM_ Sign command. 
 
There are 7 input signals in this module: Authorization Tag, Parameter Size, Ordinal, 
Key Handle” identifier of a loaded key that can perform digital signatures”, Area to Sign” The 
value to sign” and nonceOdd ”Nonce generated by the system associated with Key Handle”. The 
resulting output command message block associated with this input is given in Figure 6.13. 
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Figure 6.13: Output message block for the TPM_ Sign command. 
 
6.1.1.5 TPM_Seal \ TPM_Unseal modules 
 
TPM_ Seal command encrypts data using 1024- bit public key and then associates it with 
specific PCR values. While TPM_ Unseal command decrypts the data if the PCR values match 
those at the time of sealing. Figure 6.14 shows an example of TPM_ Seal command flow between 
the TPM and a user application. 
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Figure 6.14: TPM_ Seal command flow. 
Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16 show examples of input message blocks of the TPM_Seal\ 
TPM_Unseal commands. 
 
Figure 6.15: Input message block for the TPM_ Seal command. 
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There are 10 input signals in the TPM_ Seal module: Authorization Tag, Parameter Size, 
Ordinal, Key Handle, encAuth “The encrypted AuthData for the sealed data”, PCR_Info_Size, 
PCR_Info “The PCR selection information”, Data Size, Data, and nonceOdd. The resulting 
output command message block associated with this input is given in Figure 6.17. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.16: Input message block for the TPM_ Unseal command. 
 
There are 7 input signals in the TPM_ Unseal module: Authorization Tag, Parameter Size, 
Ordinal, Key Handle, TCG_STORGED_DATA” The encrypted data generated by TPM_Seal”, 
nonceEven and nonceOdd. The resulting output command message block associated with this 
input is shown in Figure 6.18. 
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Figure 6.17: Output message block for the TPM_ Seal command. 
 
Figure 6.18: Output message block for the TPM_ Unseal command. 
6.1.2 TPM-sliced implementation 
 
After implementing the single-block TPM, we divide it into k shares as described in 
Chapter 5. We then used MATLAB to divide the TPM input messages and the RSA Keys. To 
evaluate the effect of selecting different numbers of shares, we divided the TPM into 4 and 10 
shares. 
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6.2 Simulation and Synthesis Result 
The results shown below are the waveforms generated from the TPM_TOP testbench 
module described in Appendix A. The TPM_TOP test bench simulation fully validated the design 
by constructing random TPM messages, passing them to the model, and comparing the output 
messages to the expected results. The output simulation was performed using the ModelSim 
Simulator. 
6.2.1 Simulation results  
This section gives the simulation results for various TPM Commands. 
6.2.1.1 TPM_Extend Command  
To test the TPM_Extend command, a sample input message block with the same structure 
as that shown in Figure 6.3 was passed to the TPM_TOP test bench.  Figure 6.19 shows the 
simulation Waveform of TPM_Extend command. The clock period was 100 ns, and the output 
message was generated in about 9 us.
 
Figure 6.19: Waveform for executing TPM_Extend command. 
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6.2.1.2 TPM_GetRandom command  
 structure as that shown in Figure 6.6 was passed to the TPM_TOP test bench.  Figure 6.20 
shows the simulation Waveform of TPM_GetRandom command. The clock period was 100 ns, 
and the output message was generated in about 33 us.  
 
Figure 6.20: Waveform for executing TPM_ GetRandom command. 
 
6.2.1.3 TPM_ CreateWrapKey command  
To test the TPM_ CreateWrapKey command, a sample input message block with the same 
structure as that shown in Figure 6.9 was passed to the TPM_TOP test bench.  Figure 6.21 shows 
the simulation Waveform of TPM_ CreateWrapKey command. The clock period was 100 ns and 
the output message was generated in about 0.16 sec.  
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Figure 6.21: Waveform for executing TPM_ CreateWrapKey command. 
 
6.2.1.4 TPM_ Sign command 
To test the TPM_ Sign command, a sample input message block with the same structure 
as that shown in Figure 6.12 was passed to the TPM_TOP test bench. Figure 6.22 shows the 
simulation Waveform of TPM_ Sign command. The clock period was 100 ns, and the output 
message is generated in about 0.16 sec.  
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Figure 6.22: Waveform for executing TPM_ Sign command. 
6.2.1.5 TPM_ Seal command 
To test the TPM_ Seal command, a sample input message block with the structure of 
Figure 6.15 was applied to the TPM_TOP test bench. The clock period was 100 ns, and the output 
message was generated in about 0.47 sec. The output is displayed in three waveforms to provide 
a clear view of the values of the various signals. Figure 6.23 shows the simulation waveforms of 
the TPM_ Seal command. 
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Figure 6.23: Waveform for executing TPM_ Seal command. 
 
Figure 6.24: Waveform for Input/ Output signals of the TPM_ Seal command. 
 
 
Figure 6.25: Waveforms for Input “Data” and Output “SealedData” signals. 
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6.2.1.6 TPM_ Unseal command 
To test the TPM_ Unseal command, an input message block with the same structure as in 
Figure 6.16 was passed to the TPM_TOP test bench. The clock period was 100 ns, and the output 
message was generated in about 0.16 sec. The output is displayed in three waveforms to provide 
a clear view of the values of the various signals. Figure 6.26 shows the simulation waveforms of 
the TPM_ Unseal command. 
 
Figure 6.26: Waveform for executing TPM_ Seal command. 
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Figure 6.27: Waveform for Input/ Output signals of the TPM_ Seal command. 
 
To validate the functionality of the TPM_ Unseal command, we chose the input data 
value to be the same as the output sealedData value from the previous command. Figure 6.25 
shows the input data block and the output sealedData block. In Figure 6.28, the sealedData 
value is used as an input and the output secret returns the same value of the data block used in 
the TPM_ Seal command.
 
Figure 6.28: Waveforms for Input “Data” and Output “Secret” signals. 
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6.2.2 Summary 
 
The execution times for various TPM commands are presented in Table 6.2. Results are 
presented for the single TPM, as well as the proposed sliced TPM. 
Table 6.2: Execution time for TPM Commands. 
 Clock speed =100ns, freq=10 MHz 
 
 
 
 
 
Commands Number of 
shares 
Execution Time for 
each shares 
Ratio Number of 
cycles 
TPM_extend single TPM 9.15 μs  1 92 
 
4 Shares 9.15 μs  1 
10 Shares 9.14 μs  1 
TPM_GetRandom single TPM 33.8 μs  1 339 
4 Shares 33.7 μs  1 338 
10 Shares 33.6 μs  1 337 
TPM_ 
CreateWrapKey 
single TPM 159 ms  1 1595692 
4 Shares 11.1 ms  93% 114820 
10 Shares 2.75 ms  98% 27528 
TPM_sign single TPM 158 ms  1 1579903 
4 Shares 10.0 ms  93% 100244 
10 Shares 1.29 ms  99% 12942 
TPM_Seal single TPM 473 ms  1 4730064 
4 Shares 30.0 ms  93% 300049 
10 Shares 3.75 ms  99% 37581 
TPM_Unseal  single TPM 158.0 ms  1 1579704 
4 Shares 10.0 ms  93% 100091 
10 Shares 1.28 ms  99% 12882 
 
 
The results indicate that commands involving RSA operations impose high execution-
time overhead. For example, the TPM_CreateWrapKey command, involving 1,024-bit RSA key 
generation and validation as well as encryption of the private key and some other cryptographic 
functions, requires 158 ms. Similarly, large execution times are required for TPM_sign, 
TPM_Seal, and TPM_Unseal operations. However, this overhead can be reduced by splitting the 
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TPM into k shares. For example, the execution time for the TPM_CreateWrapKey command is 
reduced to about 1.2 ms. 
6.2.3 Synthesis results 
 
Synthesis is the process of converting the register transfer level (RTL) representation of a 
design into an optimized gate-level netlist. The TPM code was synthesized for 0.05 µm CMOS 
technology at a 33MHz clock signal. 
6.2.3.1 Synthesis area results 
The synthesis silicon area results are summarized in Table 6.3. They reflect a significant 
area increase when the TPM is divided into k shares. In the case of 4 shares the area for each 
share was decreased by 2.93% while the total area was increased by 74%. In the case of 10 
shares the area for each share was decreased by 3.3% while the total area was increased by 85%. 
The total area of the TPM consists of the following: The AES engine utilizes 
approximately 82,600 cells area (3%), the SHA-1 engine utilizes approximately 20,700 cells area 
(2%), the RNG engine utilizes approximately 78,500 cells area (3%), the RSA engine utilizes 
approximately 120,000 cells area (7%), the SHA-1 engine utilizes approximately 20,700 cells 
area (2%), and the six TPM commands engines utilizes approximately 4,780,000 cells (85%). 
The six TPM commands engines dominate the total area. Since our implementation was 
especially specific to these six TPM commands, we did not try to share the resources for the 
executions; we created a separate engine for each of these TPM commands. Overall, in a real 
TPM, the TPM commands should implement with share resources as an ALU or as a common 
basic hardware engine.  
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Table 6.3: Synthesis area results. 
Number of Shares RSA key size RSA area Each TPM 
share area 
Ratio Total area 
single TPM 1024-bit 117285.12 5978405.87 1 5978405.87 
4 Shares 256-bit 29298.44 5802143,44 2.93% 23209653.76 
10 Shares 160-bit 18162.36 5780160.16 3.30% 57801601.6 
 
6.2.3.2 Synthesis energy results 
The synthesis energy results are summarized in Table 6.4. They reflect a significant 
energy increase when the TPM is divided into k shares. In the case of 4 shares the total energy 
was increased by 67%. While in the case of 10 shares the total energy was increased by 85%. 
Table 6.4: Synthesis energy results 
Number of Shares RSA key size RSA energy Each TPM share 
energy 
Ratio Total energy 
single TPM 1024-bit .0034 J .159 J 1 .159 J 
4 Shares 256-bit .00039 J .0077 J 81.14% .03J 
10 Shares 160-bit .0000056 J .0009J 94.5% .0089 J 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, we implemented and simulated a small version of a TPM that can perform a 
subset of TPM commands, using both a single TPM implementation and a sliced TPM 
implementation. We then analyzed the execution time, silicon area requirement, and energy 
usage under different conditions.  We also varied the number of shares. The functionality of the 
proposed algorithm was coded in Verilog, synthesized using 0.05 µm CMOS technology, and 
simulated in Modelsim. 
 The results indicate that the proposed algorithm improves TPM efficiency; the sliced 
TPM achieved lower execution time for the commands involving RSA operations, while the 
silicon area consumed for the sliced TPM increased compared to that of the single TPM.  In the 
case of 4 shares the required execution time of the TPM commands that involving RSA 
operation in each slice was decreased by 93%, and the area of each slice was decreased by 2.93% 
while the total area was increased by 74%.  In the case of 10 shares the required execution time 
of the TPM commands that involving RSA operations in each slice was decreased by 99%, and 
the area of each slice was decreased by 3.3% while the total area was increased by 85%. 
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APPENDIX: TPM SOURCE FILES 
 
 
`timescale 100ns/10ns 
`define CYCLE      1.0 
`define End_CYCLE  1000000        
`define TOTAL_DATA 6 
`define TEST_DATA  6 
 
 
Module TPM_TOP_tb; 
 
//==============================================================
= 
//==== signal declaration 
======================================= 
    // ---------------------------------------------------------
- 
    // -------- singals in top module --------------------------
- 
    reg  clk; 
    reg  reset; 
    wire ready,valid; 
    reg  we; 
    reg  oe; 
    reg  start; 
    reg  [7:0] addr; 
    reg  [31:0] IN_Bytes; 
    wire [31:0] Out_Bytes; 
   
    // -------- variables &indices -----------------------------
- 
    integer i,j; 
    reg [3199:0] command_buffer [0:5]; 
    initial $readmemh("./tpmtest/tpm.dat", command_buffer); 
     
 
//==== module connection 
======================================== 
    TPM_TOP dut(       
        .clk(clk), 
        .reset(reset), 
        .ready(ready), 
        .we(we), 
        .oe(oe), 
        .start(start), 
        .addr(addr), 
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        .IN_Bytes(IN_Bytes), 
        .Out_Bytes(Out_Bytes), 
        .valid(valid) 
    ); 
 
//==== start simulation 
========================================= 
     
    always begin  
        #(`CYCLE/2) clk = ~clk;  
    end 
     
    initial begin 
        #0; // t = 0 
        clk     = 1'b1; 
        reset   = 1'b0;  
        we      = 1'b0; 
        oe      = 1'b0; 
        start   = 1'b0; 
        addr    = 12'd0; 
        IN_Bytes  = 32'd0; 
 
        #(`CYCLE) reset = 1'b1; // t = 1 
        #(`CYCLE) reset = 1'b0; // t = 2 
         
        #(`CYCLE*0.01); 
       j = 0; 
        while(j<`TEST_DATA) begin  
        // command_buffer 
        i = 0; 
        while(i<100) begin 
            #(`CYCLE); 
            if(i==0) begin 
                we = 1'b1; 
                addr = 8'd0; 
            end 
            else begin 
                addr = addr+8'd1; 
            end 
             
             IN_Bytes = command_buffer[j][(addr*32) +: 32]; 
            i = i+1; 
        end 
             
            #(`CYCLE); 
            start = 1'b1; 
            we = 1'b0; 
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            addr = 8'd0; 
            IN_Bytes = 0; 
             
            #(`CYCLE) start = 1'b0; 
            @(posedge ready); 
            @(posedge clk); 
            #(`CYCLE*0.01); 
             
            i = 0; 
            while(i<100) begin 
                if(i==0) begin 
                    oe = 1'b1; 
                    addr = 8'd0; 
                end 
                else begin 
                    addr = addr+8'd1; 
                end 
                #(`CYCLE); 
                if(Out_Bytes !== 32'd0) begin 
                   // $display("--------------------------------
---------------------\n"); 
                    $display("Command_CODE= %th   Buffer[%d:%d]: 
output %h \n", command_buffer[j][49:41] , addr*32+31, addr*32, 
Out_Bytes); 
                    #1; 
                  end 
                i = i+1; 
            end 
            oe = 1'b0; 
            addr = 8'd0; 
            #(`CYCLE*2); 
            j = j+1; 
      //  end 
end          
         
        $display("----------------------------------------------
-------\n"); 
        $display("Congratulations! All data have been generated 
successfully!\n"); 
        $display("-------------------------PASS-----------------
-------\n"); 
        $finish; 
    end 
 
 
endmodule 
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module  TPM_TOP( 
              clk, 
             reset, 
             start, 
             ready, 
             valid, 
             IN_Bytes, 
            we, 
            oe, 
            addr, 
            Out_Bytes  
         ); 
 //==== in/out declaration ================================== 
    //-------- input --------------------------- 
       
input clk; 
input reset; 
   input we; 
    input oe; 
    input start; 
    input [7:0] addr; 
    input [31:0] IN_Bytes; 
     
    //-------- output -------------------------------------- 
    output ready,valid;   
    output [31:0] Out_Bytes; 
     
 
//==== reg/wire declaration ================================ 
 
     reg [  31:0] Out_Bytes; 
     wire [  31:0]  next_Out_Bytes; 
 
reg reset_1; 
reg ready, valid; 
reg [2:0] cnt; 
reg [2:0]state; 
    reg [2:0] nxstate; 
    parameter TPM_Extend_command=20; 
    parameter TPM_GetRandom_command=70; 
    parameter TPM_CreateWrapKey_command=31; 
    parameter TPM_Seal_command=23; 
    parameter TPM_Unseal_command=24; 
    parameter TPM_sign_command=60; 
     
  parameter idle = 0;  
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  parameter test = 1; 
  parameter nonce_generator = 2;  
  parameter command_exc =3; 
  parameter command_output = 4; 
  reg [0:3199] a, next_a, Buffer,next_a_out,a_out; 
   
  assign next_Out_Bytes = (oe&ready)? a_out[(addr*32)+:32] : 
32'b0; // reading  
  always @(*) begin // writing 
        next_a = a; 
        next_a_out= a_out; 
        if (we & ready) begin 
            next_a [(addr*32)+: 32] = IN_Bytes; 
            $display("Writing a[%d+:32] = %h",addr*32,IN_Bytes); 
        end  
        else next_a_out = Buffer; 
    end 
     
      always @(posedge clk or posedge reset) begin 
        if (reset == 1'b1)begin 
            a   <= 1024'b0; 
            Out_Bytes <= 32'b0; 
        end else begin 
            a   <= next_a; 
            a_out   <= next_a_out; 
            Out_Bytes <= next_Out_Bytes; 
        end 
    end 
     
  wire nonce_Gen_ready,nonce_Gen_valid; 
  reg nonce_Gen_start,test_valid,nonce_valid,End_rng; 
  wire [159:0] RN_out; 
  nonce_Gen nonce_Gen_dut( 
        .clk(clk), 
        .reset(reset), 
        .start(nonce_Gen_start), 
        .ready(nonce_Gen_ready), 
        .valid(nonce_Gen_valid), 
        .RN_out(RN_out),.cnt(cnt),.End_rng(End_rng) 
    ); 
    wire TPM_Extend_ready,TPM_Extend_valid; 
  reg TPM_Extend_start; 
  reg  [7:0] tag_in; // TPM_TAG TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND2 
  reg [31:0] paramSize_in; //paramSize Total number of input 
bytes including paramSize  
  reg [7:0] ordinal_in,Command_CODE; 
  reg [3:0] pcrNum; 
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  reg [159:0] inDigest 
  wire [7:0] tag_out_e;  
  wire [31:0] paramSize_out_e ; 
  wire [3:0] returnCode_e; 
  wire [7:0] ordinal_out_e 
  wire [159:0] outDigest; 
 TPM_Extend TPM_Extend_dut ( 
            .clk(clk), 
        .reset(reset), 
        .start(TPM_Extend_start), 
        .ready(TPM_Extend_ready), 
        .valid(TPM_Extend_valid), 
        .tag_in(tag_in),.paramSize_in(paramSize_in), 
.ordinal_in(ordinal_in), .pcrNum(pcrNum),  
            .inDigest(inDigest), .tag_out(tag_out_e), 
.paramSize_out(paramSize_out_e), .returnCode(returnCode_e) 
            
,.ordinal_out(ordinal_out_e),.outDigest(outDigest) ); 
 wire TPM_Seal_ready,TPM_Seal_valid; 
  reg TPM_Seal_start;  
reg [7:0] keyhandle;   
reg [31:0] inDataSize; 
reg [1023:0] inData; 
reg [3071:0] inData2; 
reg [319:0] pcrInfo; 
reg [319:0] encAuth; 
reg [159:0] nonceEven_in,nonceOdd_in ; 
 
wire [159:0] nonceEven_out_s,nonceOdd_out_s ; 
wire [31:0] resAuth_s,resAuth_i,resAuth_c; 
wire [3071:0]sealedData;  
wire [7:0] tag_out_s;  
  wire [31:0] paramSize_out_s ; 
  wire [3:0] returnCode_s; 
  wire [7:0] ordinal_out_s;          
TPM_Seal TPM_Seal_dut( 
            .clk(clk), 
             .reset(reset), 
             .start(TPM_Seal_start), 
             .ready(TPM_Seal_ready), 
             .valid(TPM_Seal_valid), 
            .tag_in(tag_in),.paramSize_in(paramSize_in), 
.ordinal_in(ordinal_in), 
            .keyhandle(keyhandle), 
            .encAuth(encAuth), 
            .inDataSize(inDataSize), 
            .nonceEven_in(nonceEven_in), 
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            .nonceOdd_in(nonceOdd_in), 
            .inData(inData),     
            .pcrInfo(pcrInfo), 
            .tag_out(tag_out_s), 
.paramSize_out(paramSize_out_s), .returnCode(returnCode_s), 
           .ordinal_out(ordinal_out_s), 
            .nonceEven_out(nonceEven_out_s), 
            .nonceOdd_out(nonceOdd_out_s), 
            .sealedData(sealedData), 
            .resAuth(resAuth_s)   
         ); 
    wire TPM_Unseal_ready,TPM_Unseal_valid; 
  reg TPM_Unseal_start;  
  wire [1023:0]secret;  
 wire [31:0] secret_size; 
 wire [7:0] tag_out_u; //TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND2 
  wire [31:0] paramSize_out_u ; 
  wire [3:0] returnCode_u; 
  wire [7:0] ordinal_out_u;   
  wire [159:0] nonceEven_out_u,nonceOdd_out_u ; 
   
 TPM_Unseal  TPM_Unseal_dut( 
             .clk(clk), 
             .reset(reset), 
             .start(TPM_Unseal_start), 
             .ready(TPM_Unseal_ready), 
            .valid(TPM_Unseal_valid), 
            .tag_in(tag_in), 
            .paramSize_in(paramSize_in), 
             .ordinal_in(ordinal_in), 
            .keyhandle(keyhandle), 
            .inData(inData2), 
            .inDataSize(inDataSize), 
            .nonceEven_in(nonceEven_in), 
            .nonceOdd_in(nonceOdd_in), 
            .tag_out(tag_out_u), 
.paramSize_out(paramSize_out_u), .returnCode(returnCode_u), 
           .ordinal_out(ordinal_out_u), 
            .nonceEven_out(nonceEven_out_u), 
            .nonceOdd_out(nonceOdd_out_u), 
            .secret_size(secret_size), 
            .secret(secret)   
         ); 
         wire 
TPM_CreateWrapKey_ready,TPM_CreateWrapKey_valid; 
  reg TPM_CreateWrapKey_start; 
  reg [7:0] parentHandel; 
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reg [319:0] dataUsageAuth; 
reg [31:0] keyinfo,authHandle; 
wire [2047:0] PubAuth ; 
wire [2207:0] wrappedKey; 
wire [7:0] tag_out_c;  
  wire [31:0] paramSize_out_c ; 
  wire [3:0] returnCode_c; 
  wire [7:0] ordinal_out_c; 
  wire [159:0] nonceEven_out_c,nonceOdd_out_c ; 
 
TPM_CreateWrapKey TPM_CreateWrapKey_dut ( 
               .clk(clk), 
        .reset(reset), 
        .start(TPM_CreateWrapKey_start), 
        .ready(TPM_CreateWrapKey_ready), 
        .valid(TPM_CreateWrapKey_valid), 
        .tag_in(tag_in),.paramSize_in(paramSize_in), 
.ordinal_in(ordinal_in), 
 
            .parentHandel(parentHandel), 
            .dataUsageAuth(dataUsageAuth), 
            .keyinfo(keyinfo), 
            .authHandle(authHandle), 
            .nonceEven_in(nonceEven_in), 
            .nonceOdd_in(nonceOdd_in), 
            .PubAuth(PubAuth),  
            .tag_out(tag_out_c), 
            .paramSize_out(paramSize_out_c), 
            .returnCode(returnCode_c), 
            .ordinal_out(ordinal_out_c), 
            .wrappedKey(wrappedKey), 
            .nonceEven_out(nonceEven_out_c), 
            .nonceOdd_out(nonceOdd_out_c), 
            .resAuth(resAuth_c)  
); 
wire TPM_GetRandom_ready,TPM_GetRandom_valid; 
  reg TPM_GetRandom_start; 
  reg [31:0] bytesRequested; 
 
wire [511:0] randomBytes ; 
wire [31:0] randomBytesSize;wire [7:0] tag_out_g; 
//TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND2 
  wire [31:0] paramSize_out_g ; 
  wire [3:0] returnCode_g; 
  wire [7:0] ordinal_out_g; 
  
TPM_GetRandom TPM_GetRandom_dut ( 
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               .clk(clk), 
        .reset(reset), 
        .start(TPM_GetRandom_start), 
        .ready(TPM_GetRandom_ready), 
        .valid(TPM_GetRandom_valid), 
        .tag_in(tag_in),.paramSize_in(paramSize_in), 
.ordinal_in(ordinal_in), 
            .bytesRequested(bytesRequested), 
            .tag_out(tag_out_g), 
            .paramSize_out(paramSize_out_g), 
            .returnCode(returnCode_g), 
            .ordinal_out(ordinal_out_g), 
            .randomBytesSize(randomBytesSize), 
            .randomBytes (randomBytes)  
         ); 
         wire TPM_sign_ready,TPM_sign_valid; 
  reg TPM_sign_start; 
  reg [319:0] areaToSign; 
reg [31:0] areaToSignSize; 
reg [31:0] privAuth; 
wire [31:0] sigSize ; 
wire [511:0] sig; 
wire [7:0] tag_out_i; 
  wire [31:0] paramSize_out_i ; 
  wire [3:0] returnCode_i; 
  wire [7:0] ordinal_out_i; 
  wire [159:0] nonceEven_out_i,nonceOdd_out_i ; 
reg ind; 
TPM_sign    TPM_sign_dut( 
            .clk(clk), 
        .reset(reset), 
        .start(TPM_sign_start), 
        .ready(TPM_sign_ready), 
        .valid(TPM_sign_valid), 
        .tag_in(tag_in),.paramSize_in(paramSize_in), 
.ordinal_in(ordinal_in), 
            .areaToSignSize(areaToSignSize), 
            .areaToSign(areaToSign), 
            .authHandle(authHandle), 
            .nonceEven_in(nonceEven_in), 
            .nonceOdd_in(nonceOdd_in), 
            .privAuth(privAuth), 
            .tag_out(tag_out_i), 
            .paramSize_out(paramSize_out_i), 
            .returnCode(returnCode_i), 
            .ordinal_out(ordinal_out_i), 
            .sigSize(sigSize), 
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            .sig(sig), 
            .nonceEven_out(nonceEven_out_i), 
            .nonceOdd_out(nonceOdd_out_i), 
            .resAuth(resAuth_i)   
         );     
 always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            reset_1 <= reset; 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  
                state <= idle; 
            else 
                state <= nxstate; 
    end 
     
     always @ (  state or  reset_1 or  start or test_valid or 
TPM_Extend_valid  or TPM_GetRandom_valid  or 
TPM_CreateWrapKey_valid  or TPM_Seal_valid or TPM_Unseal_valid 
or TPM_sign_valid or nonce_valid) 
    begin  
        nxstate <= state; 
        case ( state )  
      idle: begin 
            if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) )  
                nxstate <= test; 
            end 
        test: begin 
           if (test_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= nonce_generator; 
               end 
       nonce_generator:begin 
           if (nonce_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= command_exc; 
               end 
        command_exc: begin 
            if ((TPM_Extend_valid == 1'b1) || 
(TPM_GetRandom_valid  == 1'b1) || (TPM_CreateWrapKey_valid == 
1'b1) || ( TPM_Seal_valid == 1'b1) ||( TPM_Unseal_valid == 1'b1) 
|| ( TPM_sign_valid== 1'b1) ) 
                nxstate <= command_output; 
        end 
        
        command_output: begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
69 
 
 
         
        default : 
        begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
        endcase 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk)  begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  begin 
               valid <=1'b0; 
             Buffer<={1'b0}; 
            //    ready<=1'b0; 
               
            end 
            else begin  
                ready <= 1'b0; 
                valid <= 1'b0; 
                TPM_Extend_start <= 1'b0; 
                TPM_sign_start <= 1'b0; 
                TPM_Unseal_start <= 1'b0; 
                TPM_Seal_start <= 1'b0; 
                TPM_CreateWrapKey_start <= 1'b0; 
                TPM_GetRandom_start <= 1'b0; 
                nonce_Gen_start <= 1'b0;  
                nonce_valid <= 1'b0; 
                  case ( state )  
                idle: begin   
                    ready <= 1'b1; 
                    if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) 
) begin 
                      
                        ready <= 1'b0;  ind= 1'b1;  end 
                      else if( ind== 1'b1)begin 
                        ind<= 1'b0; ready <= 1'b0;end 
                         
                end 
               test: begin 
                 tag_in<= a [0:7]; 
                 paramSize_in<=a [8:39]; 
                    if ( paramSize_in != 8'b0 ) begin  
                    Command_CODE<= a[40:47];  
                    ordinal_in<= a[40:47]; 
                     test_valid<=1; 
                     end 
                
               end 
          nonce_generator:begin 
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            if( (Command_CODE==TPM_CreateWrapKey_command) || 
(Command_CODE== TPM_Seal_command) || 
(Command_CODE==TPM_Unseal_command) || 
(Command_CODE==TPM_sign_command))  
            begin 
           if (nonce_Gen_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                      nonce_Gen_start <= 1'b1; 
                      End_rng<=1'b1;  
                      cnt<=3'b101;        
                      end 
           if (nonce_Gen_valid == 1'b1 ) begin 
              
              nonce_valid <= 1'b1; 
                nonceOdd_in= RN_out << 2; 
                nonceEven_in = nonceOdd_in << 3;    
              end  
           end  
              else 
                       nonce_valid <= 1'b1;     
             end//end case 
        
        command_exc: begin 
           
          case ( Command_CODE )  
             
           TPM_Extend_command: begin 
            
                               if ( TPM_Extend_ready == 1'b1 )  
                                begin 
                                  TPM_Extend_start <= 1'b1; 
                                   pcrNum <= a[48:51];  
                                 inDigest<= a[52:211]; 
                                 end 
                                if ( TPM_Extend_valid == 1'b1 )  
                                
                              Buffer <= {tag_out_e 
,paramSize_out_e, returnCode_e,ordinal_out_e,outDigest,{1'b0}}; 
                                
                              end 
            TPM_GetRandom_command: begin 
            
                               if ( TPM_GetRandom_ready == 1'b1 
)  
                                begin 
                                  TPM_GetRandom_start <= 1'b1; 
                                  bytesRequested<=a[48:79]; 
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                                 end 
                                if ( TPM_GetRandom_valid == 1'b1 
)  
                                
                             Buffer<={tag_out_g 
,paramSize_out_g, 
returnCode_g,ordinal_out_g,randomBytesSize,randomBytes,{1'b0}}; 
                                                          
                              end 
         TPM_CreateWrapKey_command: begin 
            
                               if ( TPM_CreateWrapKey_ready == 
1'b1 )  
                                begin 
                                  TPM_CreateWrapKey_start <= 
1'b1; 
                                   parentHandel <= a[48:55]; 
                                   dataUsageAuth <= a[56:375]; 
                                   keyinfo<= a[376:407]; 
                                   authHandle<= a[408:439];                          
                                 end 
                                if ( TPM_CreateWrapKey_valid == 
1'b1 )  
                                
                              Buffer<={tag_out_c 
,paramSize_out_c, 
returnCode_c,ordinal_out_c,wrappedKey,PubAuth,nonceEven_out_c,no
nceOdd_out_c,resAuth_c,{1'b0}}; 
                                
                              end 
         TPM_Seal_command: begin 
            
                               if ( TPM_Seal_ready == 1'b1 )  
                                begin 
                                  TPM_Seal_start <= 1'b1; 
                                  keyhandle <= a[48:55]; 
                                  encAuth <= a[56:375]; 
                                  inDataSize <= a[376:407]; 
                                  inData <= a[408:1431]; 
                                  pcrInfo <= a[1432:1751]; 
                               end 
                                if ( TPM_Seal_valid == 1'b1 )  
                                
                              Buffer<={tag_out_s 
,paramSize_out_s, 
returnCode_s,ordinal_out_s,nonceEven_out_s,nonceOdd_out_s,sealed
Data, resAuth_s,{1'b0}}; 
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                              end 
         TPM_Unseal_command: begin 
            
                               if ( TPM_Unseal_ready == 1'b1 )  
                                begin 
                                  TPM_Unseal_start <= 1'b1; 
                                   keyhandle<= a[48:55]; 
                                  inDataSize<= a[56:87]; 
                                  inData2<= a[88:3158]; 
                                 end 
                                if ( TPM_Unseal_valid == 1'b1 )  
                                
                               Buffer<={tag_out_u 
,paramSize_out_u, 
returnCode_u,ordinal_out_u,nonceEven_out_u,nonceOdd_out_u,secret
_size, secret,{1'b0}}; 
                                
                              end 
       TPM_sign_command: begin 
            
                               if ( TPM_sign_ready == 1'b1 )  
                                begin 
                                  TPM_sign_start <= 1'b1; 
                                   areaToSignSize<= a[48:79]; 
                                  areaToSign<= a[80:399]; 
                                  authHandle<= a[400:431]; 
                                   privAuth<= a[432:463]; 
                                  end 
                                if ( TPM_sign_valid == 1'b1 )  
                                
                               Buffer<={tag_out_i 
,paramSize_out_i, 
returnCode_i,ordinal_out_i,nonceEven_out_i,nonceOdd_out_i,sigSiz
e, sig,resAuth_i,{1'b0}}; 
                                
                              end 
                endcase//case                  
                               
        end// command_exc 
         
         
        command_output: begin 
              valid<=1'b1; 
              
        end 
                endcase 
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            end 
         
    end 
endmodule 
 
 
module  TPM_Extend( 
            clk, 
   reset, 
  start,  
           tag_in, 
paramSize_in, 
          ordinal_in, 
          pcrNum,  
      inDigest, 
      tag_out, 
      paramSize_out, 
      returnCode, 
          ordinal_out, 
         outDigest, 
         ready,  
         valid ); 
 
 //==== in/out declaration ================================== 
    //-------- input --------------------------- 
 
input clk; 
input reset,start;   
output ready; 
output valid;     
input [7:0] tag_in; 
input [31:0] paramSize_in;  
input [7:0] ordinal_in;  
input [3:0] pcrNum; 
input [159:0] inDigest; 
 
 //-------- output -------------------------------------- 
 
output [7:0] tag_out; 
output [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
output [3:0] returnCode; 
output [7:0] ordinal_out;  
output [159:0] outDigest; 
 
//==== reg/wire declaration ================================ 
 
reg reset_1,test_valid; 
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reg ready; 
reg valid; 
reg [7:0] tag_out;  
reg [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
reg [3:0] returnCode; 
reg [7:0] ordinal_out; 
 
reg [2:0]state; 
reg [2:0]nxstate; 
 parameter idle = 0;  
  parameter test = 1;  
  parameter fetch_old_digest =2; 
  parameter cal_new_digest =3; 
  parameter w_new_digest =4; 
  parameter digest_output = 5; 
  reg r_wb; 
  reg [159:0] data_in,outDigest,Digest_old; 
  reg [319:0] c_digest; 
  reg [3:0] addr; 
  reg sha_start,next_i; 
  wire sha_ready,sha_digest_valid; 
  wire [159:0] data_out,out_digest; 
   
  PCR b1 
(.r_wb(r_wb),.pcr_num(addr),.digest_out(data_out),.digest_in(dat
a_in)); 
   
  sha1 dut( 
                   .clk(clk), 
                   .reset(reset_1), 
 
                   .init(sha_start), 
                   .next(next_i), 
 
                   .block({ 192'd0,c_digest}), 
 
                   .ready(sha_ready), 
 
                   .digest(out_digest), 
                   .digest_valid(sha_digest_valid) 
                 ); 
     
 always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            reset_1 <= reset; 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk) 
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    begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  
                state <= idle; 
            else 
                state <= nxstate; 
    end 
     
     always @ (  state or  reset_1 or  start or test_valid or 
sha_digest_valid or Digest_old or data_in) 
    begin  
        nxstate <= state; 
        case ( state )  
      idle: begin 
            if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) )  
                nxstate <= test; 
            end 
        test: begin 
           if (test_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= fetch_old_digest; 
               end 
        
        fetch_old_digest: begin 
        //  if (pcr_valid==1'b1) 
            nxstate <= cal_new_digest; 
        end 
        cal_new_digest: begin 
                  if (sha_digest_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= w_new_digest; 
                   
        end 
        w_new_digest: begin 
            nxstate <= digest_output; 
        end 
         
        digest_output: begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
         
        default : 
        begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
        endcase 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk)  begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  begin 
               valid <=1'b0; 
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             test_valid<=0; 
                ready<=1'b0; 
               
            end 
            else begin  
                ready <= 1'b0; 
                valid <= 1'b0; 
                sha_start <= 1'b0; 
                case ( state )  
                idle: begin 
                   ready <= 1'b1; 
                     
                    if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) 
)  
                    begin 
                       ready <= 1'b0;  
                        test_valid <= 0; 
                      end     
                end 
               test: begin 
                 if ( ordinal_in == 8'h14) 
            if ( ( pcrNum >= 4'b0 ) & ( pcrNum <= 4'b1000 )) 
begin 
                     test_valid<=1; 
                     addr <= pcrNum; 
                     r_wb<=1; 
                  
            end 
                
               end 
        
        fetch_old_digest: begin 
           
                        Digest_old <= data_out;  r_wb<= 0;               
            
        end 
        cal_new_digest: begin 
           if ( sha_ready == 1'b1 )  
                    begin 
                      next_i<= 1'b0; 
                        sha_start <= 1'b1; 
                        c_digest <= {inDigest , Digest_old}; 
                    end 
                    if ( sha_digest_valid == 1'b1 )  
                    begin 
                        outDigest <= out_digest; 
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                    end       
        end 
        w_new_digest: begin 
            data_in<= outDigest; 
        end 
         
        digest_output: begin 
              tag_out<= 8'hc4 ; //TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND2 
              paramSize_out <=paramSize_in; 
              returnCode <= 4'b1;//TPM_RESULT The return code of 
the operation. 
              ordinal_out<=ordinal_in; //TPM_COMMAND_CODE 
ordinal Command ordinal 
              valid<=1'b1; 
        end 
                endcase 
            end 
         
    end 
endmodule 
 
module  TPM_GetRandom( 
              clk, 
             reset, 
             start, 
             ready, 
             valid, 
             tag_in, 
             paramSize_in, 
            ordinal_in,//46 
            bytesRequested, 
            tag_out, 
            paramSize_out, 
            returnCode, 
            ordinal_out, 
            randomBytesSize, 
            randomBytes   
         ); 
      
input clk; 
input reset,start; 
output ready,valid;   
   
input [7:0] tag_in;  
input [31:0] paramSize_in;  
input [7:0] ordinal_in;  
input [31:0] bytesRequested; 
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output [7:0] tag_out;  
output [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
output [3:0] returnCode; 
output [7:0] ordinal_out;  
output [511:0] randomBytes ; 
output [31:0] randomBytesSize; 
reg reset_1; 
reg ready, valid; 
reg [7:0] tag_out;  
reg [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
reg [3:0] returnCode; 
reg [7:0] ordinal_out; 
reg [31:0] randomBytesSize; 
reg [511:0] randomBytes ; 
reg [2:0] cnt; 
reg [2:0]state; 
    reg [2:0]nxstate; 
 parameter idle = 0;  
  parameter test = 1;  
  parameter fetch_rng =2; 
  parameter rng_output = 3; 
  wire rng_ready,rng_valid; 
  reg rng_start,test_valid,End_rng; 
  wire [511:0] RN_out; 
  RNG_top DUT( 
            .clk(clk), 
            .reset(reset_1), 
            .start(rng_start), 
            .RN_out(RN_out), 
            .valid(rng_valid), 
            .ready(rng_ready), 
            .cnt(cnt),.End_rng(End_rng) 
        ); 
         
 always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            reset_1 <= reset; 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  
                state <= idle; 
            else 
                state <= nxstate; 
    end 
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     always @ (  state or  reset_1 or  start or rng_valid or 
test_valid) 
    begin  
        nxstate <= state; 
        case ( state )  
      idle: begin 
            if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) )  
                nxstate <= test; 
            end 
        test: begin 
           if (test_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= fetch_rng; 
               end 
        
        fetch_rng: begin 
           if (rng_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= rng_output; 
        end 
        
        rng_output: begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
         
        default : 
        begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
        endcase 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk)  begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  begin 
               valid <=1'b0; 
              
                ready<=1'b0; 
               
            end 
            else begin  
                ready <= 1'b0; 
                valid <= 1'b0; 
                rng_start <= 1'b0; 
                case ( state )  
                idle: begin 
                    ready <= 1'b1; 
                     
                    if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) 
) begin 
                      cnt<=3'b11; 
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                        ready <= 1'b0;    end 
                end 
               test: begin 
          if ( ordinal_in == 8'h46) 
                     test_valid<=1; 
                
                
               end 
        
        fetch_rng: begin 
            
           if ( rng_ready == 1'b1 )  
                    begin 
                        rng_start <= 1'b1; 
                        End_rng<= 1'b1; 
                     end 
                    if ( rng_valid == 1'b1 )  
                    begin 
                        randomBytes <= RN_out; 
                       randomBytesSize<= 32'd512; 
                    end 
        end 
         
         
        rng_output: begin 
              tag_out<= tag_in;  
              paramSize_out <=paramSize_in; 
              returnCode <= 4'b10; 
              ordinal_out<=ordinal_in; 
              valid<=1'b1; 
              
        end 
                endcase 
            end 
         
    end 
endmodule 
 
 
module TPM_sign( 
              clk, 
             reset, 
             start, 
             ready, 
             valid, 
             tag_in, 
             paramSize_in, 
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            ordinal_in,//3c 
            areaToSignSize, 
            areaToSign, 
            authHandle, 
            privAuth, 
            nonceEven_in, 
            nonceOdd_in, 
             
            tag_out, 
            paramSize_out, 
            returnCode, 
            ordinal_out, 
            sigSize, 
            sig, 
            nonceEven_out, 
            nonceOdd_out, 
            resAuth   
         ); 
      
input clk; 
input reset,start; 
output ready,valid;   
   
input [7:0] tag_in;  
input [31:0] paramSize_in;  
input [7:0] ordinal_in; 
input [159:0] nonceEven_in,nonceOdd_in; 
input [319:0] areaToSign; 
input [31:0] areaToSignSize,authHandle; 
input [31:0] privAuth; 
output [7:0] tag_out;  
output [31:0] paramSize_out,resAuth ; 
output [3:0] returnCode; 
output [7:0] ordinal_out;  
output [31:0] sigSize ; 
output [511:0] sig; 
output [159:0] nonceEven_out,nonceOdd_out; 
reg reset_1; 
reg ready, valid; 
reg [7:0] tag_out;  
reg [31:0] paramSize_out ,resAuth; 
reg [3:0] returnCode; 
reg [7:0] ordinal_out; 
reg [31:0] sigSize ; 
reg [511:0] sig; 
reg [159:0] nonceEven_out,nonceOdd_out; 
reg [2:0]state; 
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    reg [2:0]nxstate; 
 parameter idle = 0;  
  parameter test = 1;  
  parameter fetch_parentkey =2; 
  parameter find_Didest= 3; 
  parameter signDidest =4; 
  parameter sign_output = 5; 
  reg test_valid; 
  wire [1023:0] n_out,d,e; 
  reg [1023:0] dn_mem [0:1]; 
   initial $readmemh("./dat/dn1024.dat", dn_mem); 
  
        wire RSA_ready,RSA_valid; 
        reg RSA_start; 
        wire [1023:0] d_encrypt; 
        reg [1023:0] parent_d,parent_n,d_i; 
        
  RSA_1024 DUT2(.clk(clk),.reset(reset_1),.start(RSA_start), 
         
.msg(d_i),.expo(parent_d),.n(parent_n),.ready(RSA_ready),.encryp
t(d_encrypt),.valid(RSA_valid)); 
          
      wire find_Didest_ready,find_Didest_valid; 
      reg find_Didest_start, next_i;  
      reg  [319:0] c_digest; 
      wire [159:0] out_digest; 
   sha1 dut( 
                   .clk(clk), 
                   .reset(reset_1), 
                   .init(find_Didest_start), 
                   .next(next_i), 
                   .block({ 192'd0,c_digest}), 
                   .ready(find_Didest_ready), 
                   .digest(out_digest), 
                   .digest_valid(find_Didest_valid) 
                 );           
 always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            reset_1 <= reset; 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  
                state <= idle; 
            else 
                state <= nxstate; 
    end 
83 
 
 
     
     always @ (  state or  reset_1 or  start  or test_valid or 
RSA_valid  or find_Didest_valid ) 
    begin  
        nxstate <= state; 
        case ( state )  
      idle: begin 
            if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) )  
                nxstate <= test; 
            end 
        test: begin 
           if (test_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= fetch_parentkey; 
               end 
        
        fetch_parentkey: begin 
          // if (parentkey_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= find_Didest; 
        end 
       find_Didest: begin 
           if (find_Didest_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= signDidest; 
        end 
        signDidest: begin 
           if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= sign_output; 
        end 
        sign_output: begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
         
        default : 
        begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
        endcase 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk)  begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  begin 
               valid <=1'b0; 
              ready<=1'b0; 
          end 
            else begin  
                ready <= 1'b0; 
                valid <= 1'b0; 
                 find_Didest_start <= 1'b0; 
                 RSA_start <= 1'b0; 
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                case ( state )  
                idle: begin 
                    ready <= 1'b1; 
                     
                    if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) 
) begin 
                        ready <= 1'b0;   
                          end 
                end 
               test: begin 
               if ( ordinal_in == 8'h3c) 
                     test_valid<=1; 
                
               end 
        
         
        fetch_parentkey: begin 
         parent_n <= dn_mem[0]; 
         parent_d <= dn_mem[1]; 
           
        end 
         find_Didest: begin  
                       if ( find_Didest_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              find_Didest_start <= 1'b1;         
                               c_digest<= areaToSign; 
                               next_i<=1'b0; 
                               end 
                        end 
        signDidest: begin 
                           if ( RSA_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                               d_i <= {864'b0,out_digest}; 
                              RSA_start <= 1'b1; 
                              end 
                           //if ( RSA_valid == 1'b1 )  
                   end 
           
        sign_output: begin 
              tag_out<= tag_in + 2'b10; //TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND2 
              paramSize_out <=paramSize_in; 
              returnCode <= 4'b00;//TPM_RESULT The return code 
of the operation. 
              ordinal_out<=ordinal_in; //TPM_COMMAND_CODE 
ordinal Command ordinal 
              resAuth<=authHandle; 
               valid<=1'b1; 
              nonceEven_out<=nonceEven_in; 
              nonceOdd_out<=nonceOdd_in; 
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             sig<=d_encrypt[511:0]; 
             sigSize<=32'd512; 
        end 
                endcase 
            end 
         
    end 
endmodule 
 
 
 
module  TPM_Seal( 
            clk, 
             reset, 
             start, 
             ready, 
             valid, 
             tag_in, 
             paramSize_in, 
            ordinal_in,//17 
            keyhandle, 
            encAuth, 
            inDataSize, 
            inData,     
            pcrInfo, 
            nonceEven_in, 
            nonceOdd_in, 
     
            tag_out, 
            paramSize_out, 
            returnCode, 
            ordinal_out, 
            nonceEven_out, 
            nonceOdd_out, 
            sealedData, 
            resAuth   
         ); 
      
input clk; 
input reset,start; 
input [7:0] keyhandle; 
output ready,valid;     
input [7:0] tag_in;  
input [31:0] paramSize_in,inDataSize;  
input [1023:0] inData; 
input [7:0] ordinal_in;  
input [319:0] pcrInfo; 
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input [319:0] encAuth; 
input [159:0] nonceEven_in,nonceOdd_in ; 
output [7:0] tag_out;  
output [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
output [3:0] returnCode; 
output [7:0] ordinal_out;  
output [159:0] nonceEven_out,nonceOdd_out ; 
output [31:0] resAuth; 
output [3071:0]sealedData;  
reg reset_1; 
reg ready, valid; 
 
reg [7:0] tag_out;  
reg [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
reg [3:0] returnCode; 
reg [7:0] ordinal_out;  
reg [159:0] nonceEven_out,nonceOdd_out ; 
reg [31:0] resAuth;  
reg [3071:0]sealedData;  
reg [3:0]state; 
    reg [3:0]nxstate; 
 parameter idle = 0;  
  parameter test = 1;  
  parameter fetch_key =2; 
  parameter encryptData =3; 
  parameter find_Didest= 4; 
  parameter encrypt_Didest1=5; 
  parameter find_Didest2= 6; 
  parameter encrypt_Didest2=7; 
  parameter data_output = 8; 
  reg test_valid; 
  wire [1023:0] n_out,d,e; 
  reg [1023:0] dn_mem [0:1]; 
   initial $readmemh("./dat/dn1024.dat", dn_mem); 
        wire RSA_ready,RSA_valid; 
        reg RSA_start; 
        wire [1023:0] d_encrypt; 
        reg [1023:0] n_out_i,parent_d,parent_n,d_i; 
        reg [1023:0] msg_encrypt,dig1_encrypt,dig2_encrypt; 
  RSA_1024 DUT2(.clk(clk),.reset(reset_1),.start(RSA_start), 
         
.msg(d_i),.expo(parent_d),.n(parent_n),.ready(RSA_ready),.encryp
t(d_encrypt),.valid(RSA_valid)); 
          
    wire 
find_Didest_ready,find_Didest_ready2,find_Didest_valid,find_Dide
st_valid2; 
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      reg find_Didest_start, next_i,find_Didest_start2;  
      reg  [511:0] c_digest; 
      wire [159:0] out_digest; 
      reg [159:0] out_digest1; 
   sha1 dut( 
                   .clk(clk), 
                   .reset(reset_1), 
                   .init(find_Didest_start), 
                   .next(next_i), 
                   .block(c_digest), 
                   .ready(find_Didest_ready), 
                   .digest(out_digest), 
                   .digest_valid(find_Didest_valid) 
                 );   
          
 always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            reset_1 <= reset; 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  
                state <= idle; 
            else 
                state <= nxstate; 
    end 
     
     always @ (  state or  reset_1 or  start  or test_valid or 
RSA_valid  or find_Didest_valid ) 
    begin  
        nxstate <= state; 
        case ( state )  
      idle: begin 
            if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) )  
                nxstate <= test; 
            end 
        test: begin 
           if (test_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= fetch_key; 
               end 
        
        fetch_key: begin 
        //t   if (key_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= encryptData; 
        end 
       
        encryptData: begin 
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           if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= find_Didest; 
        end 
       find_Didest: begin 
           if (find_Didest_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= encrypt_Didest1; 
        end 
        encrypt_Didest1:begin 
           if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= find_Didest2; 
        end 
         find_Didest2: begin 
           if (find_Didest_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= encrypt_Didest2; 
        end 
         
        encrypt_Didest2:begin 
           if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= data_output; 
        end 
        data_output: begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
         
        default : 
        begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
        endcase 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk)  begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  begin 
               valid <=1'b0; 
              
                ready<=1'b0; 
               
            end 
            else begin  
                ready <= 1'b0; 
                valid <= 1'b0; 
                 find_Didest_start <= 1'b0; 
                 RSA_start <= 1'b0; 
                 case ( state )  
                idle: begin 
                    ready <= 1'b1; 
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                    if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) 
) begin 
                        ready <= 1'b0;   
                          end 
                end 
               test: begin 
               if ( ordinal_in == 8'h17) 
                     test_valid<=1; 
                
               end 
        
        fetch_key: begin 
            
         parent_n <= dn_mem[0]; 
        // parent_d <= dn_mem[1]; 
          parent_d <= {1004'b0,20'h10001}; 
        end 
        encryptData: begin 
                           if ( RSA_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              RSA_start <= 1'b1; 
                              d_i<=inData; 
                            end 
                          if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                            msg_encrypt<=d_encrypt; 
                   end 
           find_Didest: begin  
                       if ( find_Didest_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              find_Didest_start <= 1'b1;         
                               c_digest<= {192'd0,pcrInfo}; 
                               next_i<=1'b0; 
                               end 
                        end 
           encrypt_Didest1:begin 
           if ( RSA_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                  RSA_start <= 1'b1; 
                  d_i<={864'b0 ,out_digest}; 
              end 
              if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                            dig1_encrypt<=d_encrypt; 
             end 
         find_Didest2: begin  
                       if ( find_Didest_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              find_Didest_start <= 1'b1;         
                               c_digest<= msg_encrypt[511:0]; 
                               next_i<=1'b0; 
                               out_digest1 <= out_digest; 
                               end 
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                        end 
                         
        encrypt_Didest2:begin 
           if ( RSA_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                RSA_start <= 1'b1; 
                d_i<={864'b0 ,out_digest}; 
              end 
              if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                            dig2_encrypt<=d_encrypt; 
                          end 
        data_output: begin 
              tag_out<= tag_in + 2'b10; //TPM_TAG_RSP_COMMAND2 
              paramSize_out <=paramSize_in; 
              returnCode <= 4'b00;//TPM_RESULT The return code 
of the operation. 
              ordinal_out<=ordinal_in; //TPM_COMMAND_CODE 
ordinal Command ordinal 
              resAuth<={1'b0}; 
              
sealedData<={dig1_encrypt,dig2_encrypt,msg_encrypt}; 
              valid<=1'b1; 
              nonceEven_out<=nonceEven_in; 
              nonceOdd_out<=nonceOdd_in; 
              
        end 
                endcase 
            end 
         
    end 
endmodule 
 
 
module  TPM_Unseal( 
            clk, 
             reset, 
             start, 
             ready, 
             valid, 
             tag_in, 
             paramSize_in, 
            ordinal_in,//18  
            keyhandle, 
            inDataSize, 
            inData, 
            nonceEven_in, 
            nonceOdd_in, 
            tag_out, 
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            paramSize_out, 
            returnCode, 
            ordinal_out, 
            nonceEven_out, 
            nonceOdd_out, 
            secret_size, 
            secret   
         ); 
      
input clk; 
input reset,start; 
input [7:0] keyhandle;   
output ready,valid;     
input [7:0] tag_in;  
input [31:0] paramSize_in,inDataSize;  
input [3071:0] inData; 
input [7:0] ordinal_in;  
input [159:0] nonceEven_in,nonceOdd_in ; 
output [7:0] tag_out;  
output [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
output [3:0] returnCode; 
output [7:0] ordinal_out;  
output [159:0] nonceEven_out,nonceOdd_out ; 
output [1023:0]secret;  
output [31:0] secret_size; 
             
reg reset_1; 
reg ready, valid; 
 
reg [7:0] tag_out;  
reg [31:0] paramSize_out ; 
reg [3:0] returnCode; 
reg [7:0] ordinal_out;  
reg [159:0] nonceEven_out,nonceOdd_out ; 
reg [31:0] secret_size; 
reg [1023:0]secret;  
 
reg [2:0]state; 
    reg [2:0]nxstate; 
 parameter idle = 0;  
  parameter test = 1;  
  parameter fetch_key =2; 
  parameter decryptData =3; 
  parameter find_Didest= 4; 
  parameter compare_digist= 5; 
  parameter data_output = 6; 
  reg test_valid,secret_matches; 
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 // wire [1023:0] n_out,d,e; 
  reg [1023:0] dn_mem [0:1]; 
   initial $readmemh("./dat/dn1024.dat", dn_mem); 
        wire 
RSA_ready,RSA_ready1,RSA_ready2,RSA_valid,RSA_valid1,RSA_valid2; 
        reg RSA_start,RSA_start1,RSA_start2; 
        wire [1023:0] d_encrypt; 
        reg [1023:0] n_out_i,parent_d,parent_n,d_i; 
        wire [1023:0] decrypt1,decrypt2; 
        
  RSA_1024 DUT0(.clk(clk),.reset(reset_1),.start(RSA_start), 
         
.msg(d_i),.expo(parent_d),.n(parent_n),.ready(RSA_ready),.encryp
t(d_encrypt),.valid(RSA_valid)); 
  RSA_1024 DUT1(.clk(clk),.reset(reset_1),.start(RSA_start1), 
         
.msg(inData[1023:0]),.expo(parent_d),.n(parent_n),.ready(RSA_rea
dy1),.encrypt(decrypt1),.valid(RSA_valid1)); 
  RSA_1024 DUT2(.clk(clk),.reset(reset_1),.start(RSA_start2), 
         
.msg(inData[2047:1024]),.expo(parent_d),.n(parent_n),.ready(RSA_
ready2),.encrypt(decrypt2),.valid(RSA_valid2)); 
          
    wire 
find_Didest_ready,find_Didest_ready2,find_Didest_valid,find_Dide
st_valid2,compare_digist_valid; 
      reg find_Didest_start, next_i,find_Didest_start2;  
      reg  [511:0] c_digest; 
      wire [159:0] out_digest; 
      reg [159:0] out_digest1; 
      reg [2:0] RSA_valid_3; 
   sha1 dut( 
                   .clk(clk), 
                   .reset(reset_1), 
                   .init(find_Didest_start), 
                   .next(next_i), 
                   .block(c_digest), 
                   .ready(find_Didest_ready), 
                   .digest(out_digest), 
                   .digest_valid(find_Didest_valid) 
                 );   
          
 always @ (  posedge clk) 
    begin 
            reset_1 <= reset; 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk) 
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    begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  
                state <= idle; 
            else 
                state <= nxstate; 
    end 
     
     always @ (  state or  reset_1 or  start  or test_valid or 
RSA_valid  or find_Didest_valid or secret_matches) 
    begin  
        nxstate <= state; 
        case ( state )  
      idle: begin 
            if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) )  
                nxstate <= test; 
            end 
        test: begin 
           if (test_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= fetch_key; 
               end 
        
        fetch_key: begin 
        //t   if (key_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= decryptData; 
        end 
       
        decryptData: begin 
           if ((RSA_valid == 1'b1) || (RSA_valid1 == 1'b1) || 
(RSA_valid2 == 1'b1) ) 
                nxstate <= find_Didest; 
        end 
       find_Didest: begin 
           if (find_Didest_valid == 1'b1) 
                nxstate <= compare_digist; 
        end 
          
       compare_digist: begin 
           nxstate <= data_output; 
        end 
        data_output: begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
         
        default : 
        begin 
            nxstate <= idle; 
        end 
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        endcase 
    end 
    always @ (  posedge clk)  begin 
            if ( reset_1 == 1'b1 )  begin 
               valid <=1'b0; 
              
                ready<=1'b0; 
               
            end 
            else begin  
                ready <= 1'b0; 
                valid <= 1'b0; 
                 find_Didest_start <= 1'b0; 
                 RSA_start <= 1'b0; 
                 RSA_start1 <= 1'b0; 
                 RSA_start2<= 1'b0; 
                 case ( state )  
                idle: begin 
                    ready <= 1'b1; 
                     
                    if ( ( reset_1 == 1'b0 ) & ( start == 1'b1 ) 
) begin 
                        ready <= 1'b0;   
                          end 
                end 
               test: begin 
               if ( ordinal_in == 8'h18) 
                     test_valid<=1; 
                
               end 
        
        fetch_key: begin 
            
         parent_n <= dn_mem[0]; 
         parent_d <= dn_mem[1]; 
           
        end 
        decryptData: begin 
                           if ( RSA_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              RSA_start <= 1'b1; 
                               d_i<=inData [3071:2047]; 
                               RSA_valid_3<=1'b0; 
                            end 
                             if ( RSA_ready1 == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              RSA_start1 <= 1'b1; 
                             //  d_i<=inData [2047:3071]; 
                            end 
95 
 
 
                             if ( RSA_ready2 == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              RSA_start2 <= 1'b1; 
                           //    d_i<=inData [2047:3071]; 
                            end 
                           if (RSA_valid == 1'b1) 
                           RSA_valid_3 = RSA_valid_3 +1'b1; 
                           if (RSA_valid1 == 1'b1) 
                           RSA_valid_3 = RSA_valid_3 +1'b1; 
                           if (RSA_valid2 == 1'b1) 
                           RSA_valid_3 = RSA_valid_3 +1'b1; 
                   end 
           find_Didest: begin  
                       if ( find_Didest_ready == 1'b1 ) begin 
                              find_Didest_start <= 1'b1;         
                               c_digest<= d_encrypt[511:0]; 
                               next_i<=1'b0; 
                               end 
                        end 
         compare_digist: begin  
                       if ( out_digest == decrypt2[1023:864] )  
                              secret_matches<=1'b1; 
                            else 
                              secret_matches<=1'b1; 
                                
                        end 
        data_output: begin 
              tag_out<= tag_in + 2'b11;  
              paramSize_out <=paramSize_in; 
              returnCode <= 4'b00; 
              ordinal_out<=ordinal_in; 
              valid<=1'b1; 
              nonceEven_out<=nonceEven_in; 
              nonceOdd_out<=nonceOdd_in; 
               if ( secret_matches == 1'b1 ) begin 
                   secret_size<=32'd1024; 
                   secret<=d_encrypt; end 
                 else begin 
                   secret_size<=32'd0; 
                   secret<={1'b0}; end 
        end 
                endcase 
            end 
         
    end 
endmodule 
